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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA:
THE LAST WORD
HARRIS OMINSKY
I welcome this invitation by the editors of the Villanova Law
Review to respond to Professor Sirico's Reply to my article. For
one thing, our exchange of ideas will undoubtedly advance the
inquiry into mortgage remedies and help focus on typical areas of
agreement and disagreement. For another, I have been waiting
over thirty years for an opportunity to respond publicly to law
professors' comments on my papers-without fear of affecting my
grade. My comments may be summarized as follows:
First, the Reply does not seem to disagree that there are in-
herent flaws built into the present Pennsylvania deficiency judg-
ment laws.' Second, with one exception, the Reply agrees with
my recommended strategies for practicing lawyers. Third, the
Reply agrees with my conclusion that the recent First Pennsylvania
Bank decision on deficiency judgments cannot be relied upon as
precedent, but disagrees with my interpretation of that decision.
Fourth, the Reply agrees that some reform is needed, but would
limit it to sophisticated commercial transactions involving mixed
collateral.
I. FLAWS IN THE ACT
The Reply does not seem to disagree that there are inherent
flaws built into the present Pennsylvania deficiency judgment
laws. This section will review just four of these flaws:
(1) When there is a foreclosure on a blanket mortgage and
there is no bidding at the sheriffis sale, the results differ depend-
ing on whether the mortgaged properties happen to be in one
county or more than one county.2 Since the properties in the
same county may be sold in one sale, the Deficiency Judgment Act
is not applicable. However, because this cannot be done when
the properties are in different counties, the lender can proceed
only after compliance with the Act. Therefore, there is a different
result if the mortgaged properties are sold a day apart instead of
I. I outlined these flaws in Deficiency Judgmetts in Pemsylvania-The Lenders
Gauntlet Revisited, supra, text accompanying notes 59-63. This article will be re-
ferred to in footnotes below as the Article and Professor Sirico's Reply as the
Reply.
2. Article, notes 36 & 63 and accompanying text.
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minutes apart.3
(2) When the lender avoids a blanket mortgage and struc-
tures a transaction so that there are separate mortgages and
notes, instead of one blanket mortgage and note for the aggre-
gate loan, he avoids the applicability of the Act. 4 Professor Sirico
acknowledges this result, and even suggests this strategy as a rea-
son that the courts or legislators do not have to change the law. 5
(3) When a loan is collateralized by both real estate and
personal property, such as with a restaurant or hotel, the lender
obtains a different result depending on the order in which he pro-
ceeds against the collateral. It presents the lender with what I
have described as "The Pennsylvania Dilemma."'6 If he proceeds
against business equipment and pots and pans first, the Uniform
Commercial Code is applicable and no deficiency judgment pro-
ceedings are required. 7 If he proceeds first against the real estate,
he must comply with the Act before proceeding against the per-
sonal property.
(4) A foreclosing lender who, after completing foreclosure,
has a right to a personal judgment against a borrower may be
barred from this judgment if the lender is delayed from proceed-
ing on the judgment past the six-month deficiency judgment
deadline." Therefore, if the borrower is able, either by empty
strategies or legal defenses, to delay a personal judgment, he will
succeed in protecting all his property except for this first property
deeded to the lender at the sheriff's sale. In addition, he will suc-
ceed in protecting all of his friends and associates who have guar-
anteed that debt. Although the Reply recognizes that this
predicament could occur, the Reply suggests that it may not hap-
pen frequently enough to worry about. The Reply reaches this
conclusion on the assumption that lawyers will follow my recom-
mended strategy of obtaining a personal judgment against a
debtor before completing an in rem foreclosure action. '
That assumes all lawyers either know about this rather arcane
problem, or will find out about it when they read this article. Un-
fortunately, the case books are strewn with cases involving law-
yers, who for one reason or another, do not obtain a personal
3. See Article, notes 33-35.
4. Article, notes 37 & 64 and accompanying text.
5. Reply, text accompanying note 27.
6. Article, at 1145.
7. Article, notes 57, 58 & 62 and accompanying text.
8. Article, note 13.
9. Reply, text accompanying note 24.
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II. STRATEGIES FOR PRACTICING LAWYERS
With one exception, the Reply agrees with my recommended
strategies for practicing lawyers. The Reply does not challenge
my recommendation that the lender should avoid the Act by pro-
ceeding against the personal property first and real property sec-
ond, when the collateral consists of both real estate and personal
property. The Reply agrees with, and indeed recommends,
avoiding blanket mortgages by the use of separate mortgages in
order to avoid application of the Act.1 '
The one strategy presented in my article that was questioned
in the Reply is the recommendation to foreclose on a junior mort-
gage when the lender holds more than one mortgage on the same
property. 12 Even my article raises a question about whether this
strategy works because of potential issues of subrogation and
merger, which may be applicable to the senior mortgage. 13 How-
ever, Professor Sirico concludes that "[a] court should deduct the
property's full fair market value from the judgment on the debt
secured by the second mortgage."' 4
The hypothetical case which is criticized by Professor Sirico
involves a property worth $100,000 subject to a first mortgage of
$100,000 and a second mortgage of $50,000, both of which are
held by the same lender. 15 My article points out that upon fore-
closure on the second mortgage the lender winds up with the
property subject to the $100,000 mortgage. Since the property is
only worth $100,000 and is subject to the first mortgage of
$100,000, the debtor has acquired a property with no net worth.
Therefore, he should receive no credit toward the $50,000 sec-
ond mortgage under the provisions of the Act."' The result of a
foreclosure on a junior lien should be the same whether the fore-
closing lender holds the first mortgage at the time of the sale or
whether it is held by someone else, either by assignment or other-
wise. Deducting the "full fair market value" from the $50,000
second mortgage debt seems to ignore the clear terms of the
10. See Article, note 13.
II. Reply, note 27 and accompanying text.
12. Article, note 32 and preceding text.
13. Article, note 32.
14. Reply, text following note 26.
15. Article, text following note 29.
16. Article, text following note 31.
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III. THE FIRST PENNSYLVAAIA BANK CASE
The Reply agrees with my conclusion that the First Penn-
sylvania Bank decision on deficiency judgments cannot be relied
upon as precedent, but disagrees with my interpretation of that
decision.
The portion of the First Pennsylvania Bank case dealing with
Pennsylvania deficiency judgments represented the view of only
two Justices on the deficiency judgment issue,' 8 was considered
dictum by one Justice,' 9 and has been "called into question" by
the Valley Trust Company case. 20 I therefore concluded in my arti-
cle that lenders must assume that the First Pennsylvania Bank case
cannot be used as precedent.2' Professor Sirico agrees with my
conclusion.22
However, Professor Sirico quarrels with my reading of the
opinion. I suggested, as does Professor Sirico, that since the First
Pennsylvania Bank case dealt with separate mortgages, it was not
clear whether the decision would have been the same if there had
been one blanket mortgage. 23 I then concluded that the court's
reasoning seems equally applicable to blanket mortgages and
that, therefore, the Justices who wrote the opinion would have
found that the Act did not apply to a blanket mortgage, any more
than to separate mortgages.
Professor Sirico is troubled by this statement and comes to
the opposite conclusion. 24 Perhaps he is misled by references in
that case to "separate mortgages." If the case had involved sepa-
rate mortgages with separate debts and separate notes applicable
17. Section 8103 provides: "After the hearing and determination.. .of the
fair market value.. .the debtor.. .shall be released and discharged of such liabil-
ity to the judgment creditor to the extent of the fair market value. . .less the
amount of all prior liens, costs, taxes and municipal claims not discharged by the
sale .. " 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8103(c) (Purdon 1982) (emphasis added).
Since the $100,000 mortgage is a "prior lien," no credit may be given to the
debtor towards the second mortgage because the amount must first be deducted
from the fair market value of $100,000 which is "received" by the lender. Any
other interpretation would require the junior mortgage holder to give the same
credit for an unencumbered property as for an encumbered one.
18. Article, text accompanying note 43.
19. Article, note 39.
20. Article, text preceding note 41.
21. Article, text following note 43.
22. Reply, text between notes 37 and 38.
23. Article, text following note 40.
24. Reply, text accompanying notes 32-36.
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to each, I would agree that the foreclosure on one mortgage
should not effect the others. 25 However, the First Pennsylvania
Bank case involved a default on one debt of $1,100,000 which was
evidenced by one note in the same amount and secured by similar
mortgages in that amount filed in five different counties. 26 Appar-
ently, each mortgage was identical except for the metes and
bounds descriptions.
Since the Act speaks of discharge of the "debt" being fore-
closed upon, it would be difficult to argue in the First Pennsylvania
Bank case that the foreclosing lender should avoid discharge on
the theory that it foreclosed on separate debt. In fact, under simi-
lar factual circumstances in the Valley Trust Company case, the su-
perior court held that the debt was discharged. 27 This whole
dispute, in fact, bolsters my argument on the need for reform.
The distinctions are fuzzy, the courts are sometimes confused,
and a practicing lawyer and a law professor cannot agree on what
the law is.
If the borrower is to have protection against a greedy lender,
why should that protection rise or fall on the form of the loan
documents? Should the borrower's rights with multiple proper-
ties hang upon the thread of whether one mortgage or many
mortgages are used, or whether the borrowed sum is broken
down into smaller debts? And if there is only one debt, as in the
First Pennsylvania Bank case, should it make a difference whether
all of the property descriptions are included as an exhibit in each
of the mortgages, or whether each of the separate mortgages con-
tain only the description required for recording that mortgage in
the applicable county?
IV. RECOMMENDED REFORM
The Reply agrees that some reform is needed, but would
25. Indeed, this is a suggested strategy adopted by the Reply. Reply, note
27.
26. First Pennsylvania Bank v. Lancaster County Tax Claim Bureau, 504 Pa.
179, 182, 470 A.2d 938, 939-40 (1983).
27. In that case there was also one bond and three separate mortgages in
the face amount of the bond, as explained in the lower court opinion in ValleyI
Trust Company. In Re Defendant's Petition to Strike or Open Judgment: Valley
Trust Company v. Lipitsky, No. 486, (Ct. Comm. P1., Cumberland Co., Pa.
1981). The common pleas court stated: "On March 20, 1980, defendants gave
their obligation to plaintiff bank in the amount of $353,000. Separate mort-
gages were given to plaintiff bank, each in the amount of $353,000, on proper-
ties situated in Lebanon, Dauphin and Cumberland Counties." Id.
1168 [Vol. 30: p. 1129
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limit it to sophisticated commercial transactions involving mixed
collateral.
Professor Sirico states that the "sophistication of the lenders
and the dearth of cases in the area suggest that the Act does not
set a trap for the unwary." 28 Perhaps Professor Sirico's own Re-
ply helps prove my point about "traps"-even for the wary. As
described above, we disagree about the strategy to be taken when
the same lender holds more than one mortgage on a property. If
we had a real case, one of us would have followed the "right"
strategy; the other one would have fallen into the "trap."
We also disagree about whether the First Pennsylvania Bank
case involved the type of "separate" mortgages which could per-
mit a lender to avoid the Act. If we were structuring a real mort-
gage loan, we may each have prepared different mortgage
documentation. One of us may have fallen into the trap of expos-
ing the lender to the gauntlet of the Act.
In addition, I suggest that there is a basic fallacy about con-
cluding anything from the "dearth of cases" which is emphasized
by the Professor. One cannot judge the number of times lawyers
and lenders have had problems under the Act by merely counting
reported judicial decisions. The delays, mistakes, costs, and
missed deadlines under the Act are not always reflected in the law
books. Frequently, lawyers who are precluded from proceeding
under the Act will not even attempt to start a legal action. Fur-
thermore, the reported cases do indicate massive confusion on
deficiency judgments. Virtually every deficiency judgment case
cited in my article29 involves a lawyer (or client) who made a mis-
take in trying to obtain a deficiency judgment. Many of them are
cases where confusion about the interpretation of the Act, or
other circumstances caused attorneys to miss the crucial six
month deficiency judgment deadline. They never got through the
"gauntlet."
Professor Sirico concludes that the Act imposes no unusually
burdensome requirements. This comment may be viewed in sev-
eral ways.
First, his Reply does not disagree with my description of the
required procedural steps. Therefore, there is no dispute that
with multiple properties the Pennsylvania mortgage lender will
have to repeat the deficiency judgment procedure for each prop-
erty the lender is forced to purchase at foreclosure, where the
28. Reply at 1160.
29. Article, notes 10-13, 35 & 55.
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properties are located in different counties or are sold at different
times.3 1° It is significant that an additional foreclosure under a
debt cannot be started until the deficiency judgment procedure is
completed on an earlier purchase. Therefore, where twenty-
nine3 l or more parcels are covered by a blanket mortgage, it
could theoretically take a lifetime for a lender to acquire all of its
collateral.
One of Professor Sirico's arguments is that the lender may
avoid all of this by using my suggestion that the loan be broken
down into separate notes and mortgages at the time the loan is
made. He labels this solution "simple." 32 However, he ignores
the second part of my strategy, cross-collateralization of the sepa-
rate mortgages, which may be necessary to give the lender com-
parable collateral to a blanket mortgage. This strategy is not a
"simple" solution. With only five properties it would involve five
separate mortgages on each property, or a total of twenty-five
mortgages instead of one. With twenty-nine properties, it would
involve 841 mortgages.
Another of Professor Sirico's arguments is that there is little
practical value to deficiency judgments anyway. He says:
"Whether increasing the size of the debt would result in a larger
recovery in light of the debtor's financial plight is a separate ques-
tion whose answer probably is almost always in the negative."133
This is no comfort to the lender who may have other available
remedies. He may be able to take over other collateral or obtain
judgment against a substantial conglomerate that is maneuvering
to insulate itself from a defaulted mortgage. Moreover, many
loans are guaranteed or insured by major companies that could
extricate themselves from their contracted liability if the lender
failed to seek a deficiency judgment within the required six-
month time frame.
The argument that deficiency judgments do not help in most
cases is reminiscent of the story about the boy who drowned in a
lake having an "average" depth of three feet.
CONCLUSION
As I suggested, the policy considerations underlying new leg-
30. Article, text accompanying note 26.
31. See Kitzmiller v. Cumberland Valley Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 10 Pa. D. &
C.3d 462 (Cumberland 1979).
32. Reply, text preceding note 27.
33. Reply at 1157.
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islation should be different for residential properties than for
other properties.3 4 It is submitted that the deficiency judgment
gauntlet need not extend to nonresidential properties. While, as
suggested by Professor Sirico, there may be political and other
reasons to protect certain classes of debtors3 5 these reasons
should not prevent reform of an inequitable and outmoded
system.
When lenders perceive unfair difficulties in enforcing their
mortgage rights, borrowers will pay for this in the form of less
favorable and more expensive mortgage terms.
In addition, one should keep in mind that the struggle be-
tween borrower and lender is not always a struggle between poor
and rich, vulnerable and invulnerable, or right and wrong. In
complex modern commercial loans involving multiple properties,
the parties are sometimes of comparable economic strength and
represented by equally competent counsel. Moreover, the lender
may not be a "deep-pocketed" international insurance company
or a national bank. It may be your retirement fund or your wid-
owed Aunt Hilda who sold her husband's business and depends
on the monthly mortgage check to pay for food.
34. See Article at 1150.
35. See Reply at 1162 & notes 44-45.
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